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Introduction 
As the meltdown sparked by the sub-prime mortgage fiasco in the USA 
continues to shake the world markets, the name of one of the twentieth century 
greatest critics of a deregulated finance, Hyman Minsky (1919-1996) is 
suddenly on everyone’s lips.  Observers, whether on the left or on the right, 
argue that we are experiencing the collapse of ‘Minskyan’ Ponzi-type financial 
pyramids. We certainly are. But what does this mean? And what precisely does 
a ‘Minskyan’ reading of finance suggest about the current state of the world 
financial markets?  This paper shows that a Minskyan lens of analysing financial 
fragility brings out two critical, and intertwined, elements of the ongoing crisis: a 
Ponzi-type mode of pyramid financing; and a highly controversial, even 
deceptive, notion of liquidity. The complex inter-play between a Ponzi-type 
financial structures operating at the global level, and regulators’ inability to 
diagnose the liquidity situation accurately, cast doubt on whether, and to what 
effect, will policy measures aimed to deal with the current crisis, work.    
 
Hyman Minsky and the global credit crunch  
Hyman Minsky, an American economist of Russian descent, developed his 
theory of financial instability in the 1960s and 1970s. For a long while, Minsky’s 
post-Keynesian vision made him an outsider of mainstream finance theory. Only 
recently his analysis found resonance with mainstream economics. What is 
particularly worrying and unique about the financial system, Minsky famously 
argued, is that stability is paradoxically destabilising: ‘good times’ encourage 
experimentation and excessive risk-taking, ending up with a bang. This vision is 
particularly worrying for two reasons. First, it suggests that left to its own, the 
financial system is inherently unstable. Second, and that something that 
economists seem to have difficulties accepting, instability does not conform to a 
single model. The precise nature and outcome of the collapse depends on the 
specific characteristics of the economy in question.  Since historical, political, 
social and institutional settings of capitalism vary greatly, it is difficult to predict 
the precise moment a financial crisis erupts. At the same time, Minsky argued 
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that fundamentally, instability and fragility stem from the unstoppable process of 
financial innovation.1    
This insight into the nature of financial innovation makes Minsky’s theory 
pertinent to today’s world. At a time when regulators are baffled by the size of 
intricately packaged debts crumbling big corporations, it is clear that the state of 
the global credit system is primarily defined not by formal legislation and 
regulation, but by the continuing process of innovation of new financial 
products, practices and institutions. This heady ‘cocktail of innovation’ makes 
the task of public monitoring and control of the financial system incredibly 
difficult, if not outright impossible. There are at least two reasons for this. The 
first has to do with the very nature of financial innovation: typically, newly 
devised financial techniques and products add to a sense of optimism and 
confidence in the strength of the markets. Up until the summer of 2007, many 
policymakers  and regulators continued to praise what they perceived as the 
wider risk-management facilities offered by  new derivative products and in 
particular, the process of securitisation. Only quite recently, one official boldly 
declared: “a number of changes in the environment [that] point to some 
sustainable reduction in risk premia: more credible monetary regimes, more 
flexible labour and product markets…; improved instruments and markets for 
managing risk; better diversified portfolios.”2 A few months later, as the world 
markets continue to crumble and more and more big financial houses write off 
billions of dollars, the hidden side of this new financial environment comes into 
light. Optimism offered by new techniques is deceptive. While for a short while 
new products and techniques may help diversify companies’ portfolio and add 
to a sense of robustness and liquidity in the markets, in fact many of these so-
called new products only re-distribute, and worse, hide and multiply the risks 
involved. Indeed, the latest ‘hot’ product of the global spiral of financial evolution 
                                                 
1 Minsky, H., 1982a,  Can ‘It happen Again?, New York: M.E. Sharpe. Minsky, H. 1982b, “The 
Financial Instability Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and the Behavior of the Economy ”, in Ch. 
Kindleberger and  JP. Laffargue, Financial Crises. Theory, History and Policy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.Minsky, H., 1986, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press.  Minsky, H., 1991, “Financial Crises: Systemic or Idiosyncratic”, 
Working Paper No. 51, Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, April.   
2 Lower risk premia – compressed risk premia, coupled with high appetite for risk. All in Tucker, 
P., 2007, “ A Perspective on recent monetary and financial system developments”, speech to 
Merrill Lynch Conference, 26 April, page 5.   
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- collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) -  turned out to be the pinnacles of the 
ongoing credit crunch.  
The second reason for the confusion among policymakers and regulators 
dealing with the credit crunch has to do with their own policies. Financial 
deregulation and liberalisation, so highly praised a decade ago, turned out to be 
a dangerous beast, and has gone out of hand of public authorities. According to 
the data from the BIS, by June 2007, about 84% of all trades in financial 
derivatives take place in Over the Counter (OTC) markets, not on regulated 
exchanges.3 Unlike an organised stock exchange, in OTC markets, trading 
takes place on a one-to-one basis between the buyer and the seller, and prices 
and volumes of trades are not disclosed.4 Effectively, that means that the 
market is unregulated and uncontrolled.  Nearly half of global lending is 
siphoned off through offshore financial centres, and due to the lack of 
transparency of these centres, we simply do not know when highly complex 
financial pyramids reach critical proportions. We do not know who exactly owes 
what and to whom in the offshore world. Moreover, while the process of 
securitisation has made  many  assets highly tradable, the ‘bundling together’ of 
such assets makes the task of evaluation  price exposures, the nature of risks 
involved, as well as the very identity of borrower and lender, virtually 
impossible. In the global privatised credit system, as markets begin to sense 
speculation has gone over the top, nervousness spreads, triggering a crisis.  
Which is what is happening in the credit crunch of 2007-2008. And which is why 
the name of Minsky, who for a long while had been on the margins of 
mainstream finance and economics, suddenly recurs on the pages of the 
Financial Times, the Economist and even the IMF.  
In itself, this is surprising. Hyman Minsky was a pessimist: his vision of 
financial capitalism emphasises inherent instability, and unpredictability, of 
finance, rather than optimality of free markets. And although some observers of 
the current meltdown believe that much like many previous episodes of 
instability, this is only a temporary, and benign, correction of markets values, 
                                                 
3 BIS. Derivatives Statistics; Quarterly, Basle: Bank for International Settlements.  
4 Dodd, R., 2007, “Subprime: Tentacles of a crisis”, Finance and Development, December, 44:4.  
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there are  many reasons why Minsky’s pessimistic interpretation of events may 
offer a more accurate, and sobering, reading of the crisis and its implications. 
 
The Ponzi constitution of today’s financial system  
The most oft-cited element of Minsky’s model is the distinction he introduced 
between three modes of finance: hedged, speculative and Ponzi. An advanced 
financial system goes, he says, through three stages: it begins with hedged 
finance, whereby borrowers raise money against collateralised assets. But as 
the period of growth continues, borrowers over-estimate the potential for 
growth, and borrow against future asset growth: in short, they speculate. 
Eventually, the bubble of speculative finance develops into what Minsky called 
Ponzi finance. The term comes from Carlo Ponzi, the most famous, though 
clearly not the only one, architect of a pyramid scheme. Ponzi’s pyramids, 
involving ‘investment’ in real estate and land, ripped off more than forty million 
Americans during the US property boom of the 1920s. He was convicted of 
fraud several times, and died in poverty. Minsky’s usage of the term Ponzi  
describes a financial unit that can only service past debts by new borrowings, 
and thus is de facto bankrupt – it is the inter-bank equivalent of paying your 
Visa card by borrowing on your Mastercard.    
Essentially, a Ponzi collapse is a debt crisis: when there is too much debt 
accumulated by an economic agent, and there is no way to either get the 
resources to pay the debt (and interest), postpone the payments, or shift the 
debt on to someone else, economic agents face insolvency. Plain and simple.  
The political and economic underpinnings of Ponzi finance in the sub-prime 
market are very complex. According to Jan Kregel of the Levy Institute, they are 
critically related to the way risk has been valued, assessed, and modelled, by 
banks and financial institutions since the liberalisation reforms were introduced 
in the 1980s. In this element, he notes, the ongoing financial crisis does differ 
from the context Minsky identified originally, yet the consequences will be 
severe: it may still lead to a process of debt deflation and recession.5 The fact 
that a subprime crisis in the USA (which was entirely unavoidable, considering 
that rising interest rates were bound to hit those who had difficulties paying 
                                                 
5 Kregel, J., 2007, “ Minsky’s cushions of safety. Systemic Risk and the Crisis in the US 
Subprime Mortgage Market”, Policy Brief, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. 
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even during the good times) is generating systemic nervousness around the 
world, suggests that we are in the midst of a structural collapse of Ponzi 
schemes. 
Yet apart from the seer scale of the collapse and uncertainty as to its 
long-term consequences, there is another crucial, yet so far overlooked, aspect 
of the current crisis. Ponzi finance, as the label suggests, implies a crucial role 
of intentional deceit: financing debts with new borrowings is the basic principle 
of a pure pyramid scheme. In the 1990s post-socialist Europe for instance, 
many people repeated Carlo Ponzi’s fate, and have been imprisoned for fraud 
through the construction of financial pyramids. The current crisis in the world 
markets, therefore, raises some uneasy political questions: What was the role of 
fraud, corruption and simple negligence in the recent expansion of the mortgage 
bubble, the hedge fund industry and other opaque segments of global finance?  
Would it be correct to suggest that European and other international markets, 
which today are all feeling the strains of the US subprime malaise, have 
themselves become embroiled, wittingly or unwittingly, in Ponzi schemes? 
In this instance, the tale of Northern Rock is revealing. The scandal of 
the British bank shows not only how dangerously interconnected financial 
markets have become, although this seems to be the lesson most 
commentaries chose to draw from the Rock’s collapse.  Much more worryingly, 
the collapse of the bank revealed that the political regime of deregulated credit 
and the economic climate requiring companies to come up with ever more 
sophisticated ways to originate, value, manage and trade risk, actually helps 
disguise, if not encourage, fraudulent financial practices. Worse, existing 
regulation of financial innovation may help ‘clever’ financers make their frauds 
seem legitimate.  
Two – very problematic - elements behind the Rock’s story are relevant 
in this case. The first is what seems to be pure financial negligence and 
unaccountability: the management of the Bank has failed to act on the rising 
riskiness and correspondingly, progressive deterioration of the quality of loans 
offered to its customers. According to the Guardian’s investigation of the Rock’s 
portfolio, in the short period of three years, mortgage loans of over 90% of the 
purchase price of a house have soared eightfold (from £2.7 bn to £16bn). On 
nearly 2,500 mortgages, loans have exceeded the value of the property, with a 
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value of £263m (Three years ago, the figure was £13m on 158 homes). Arrears 
in repayments to the Rock, in turn, have been growing: around 10,000 Rock 
customers were a month or longer late in their mortgage repayments, on loans 
worth nearly £1.2bn. (At the end of 2003, there were only 2,500 in the same 
difficulties, with mortgages worth £168.8m.). Moreover, if in 2003 the Rock 
repossessed 80 properties, in 2006 the figure rose to more than 1,000 
properties. By the end of September 2007, according to the Guardian, 912 
properties had been repossessed.6 Why was  this apparent deterioration of the 
bank’s portfolio not acted upon in time, and why did  the bank continue to lend 
and trade in complex financial  products knowing that the  risks on already 
outstanding loans are growing?  
One possible answer to these questions suggests simple negligence on 
the part of the Bank’s managers. That scenario implies that the crisis of 
Northern Rock is a one-off phenomenon, and does not require any systemic 
action. Another possible answer is more sobering:  in the global credit boom, 
the bank got carried away, probably further encouraged by the notorious moral 
hazard factor: it is too important to be allowed to fail. (Which is why billions of 
pounds of public money will now be used to bail the bank out). Considering that 
the Rock was not alone in the game of sub-prime mortgage and securitised 
finance, the latter answer seems to be more realistic. As Jan Kregel’s explains, 
in the contemporary financial system, companies manage risk on the basis of 
‘originate and distribute’ principle:  banks seek to maximize their profits by 
moving lending to unrelated affiliates, and off their balance sheets.7 That implies 
that seeds of a Minskyan Ponzi crisis stem not from individual undervaluation of 
risks by financial companies (as simple negligence by Rock’s managers would 
imply), but from the very constitution of the modern credit system itself.  This 
reading of the Rock’s crisis, and the  credit crunch as a whole, would require  a 
much more radical, and comprehensive, political response. Individual bailout 
and even temporary nationalisation  will not suffice to restore stability, at least 
not in the long run.  
                                                 
6 Griffiths, I., 2007, “Revealed: massive hole in Northern Rock's assets”, The Guardian,  23 
November.  
7 Kregel, J., 2007, page 11.  
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The second problem that has come into light after the Northern Rock 
crisis fits into fraud and deception more squarely. An investigation of the Rock’s 
ownership structure  by an independent tax expert Richard Murphy revealed an 
artificial scheme employed by Northern Rock to disguise £50 billion  through the 
use of an offshore trust company (Granite) – which financed Northern Rock -  
and an unsuspecting charity in the North-East of England, whose name was 
used, presumably, for financial gains, and without its knowledge. The charity 
however, received only one donation from staff in 2001 and was not aware of 
£50 billion under its name. As Murphy argues, this dodgy financing scheme 
“should be a concern for the Bank and the Treasury particularly if the 
emergency loans have actually been used to finance the activities of Granite 
rather than Northern Rock.”8 
It remains unclear whether official bail-out measures take into account 
the facts uncovered by Murphy, and what consequences it would entail for 
perpetrators of the scheme. It itself,  the way Northern Rock crisis is being dealt 
with raises  many issues about how private financial gains and socialised losses  
are related, and addressed,  by political leaders. But apart from this, the 
Northern Rock story also raises concerns about firstly, how many other 
companies might be benefiting from similar schemes through the use of 
structured finance and complex investment pyramids. And secondly, how many 
companies, and to what cost, are intertwined in the complex pyramids of dodgy 
money. According to the Financial Times, lead underwriters on the Granite 
programme were Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and UBS; underwriters were 
Barclays Capital, Citigroup, JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley.9 
The list which links the names of the world largest investment banks with 
an obscure, and very dodgy, financial scheme, suggests that bad debts, sub-
prime lending and hence, the current crisis, is not the outcome of  one 
malfunctioning institution, market segment, or even a financial model. Rather, it 
is an outcome of a political regime which has facilitated the privatisation of 
financial risks, at a cost of socialising its losses. In other words, a regime that 
made Ponzi principle a legitimate, and prominent, vehicle of modern finance. 
Unlike the 1920s America or 1990s Russia, however, the architects of today’s 
                                                 
8 Financial Times: Alphaville Blog: “ The uncharitable tale of Northern Rock”.    
9 FT Alfphaville, Blog Archive.  
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Ponzi pyramids are much harder to identify. They do not only include financial 
geniuses devising models in back offices across the City of London, Wall Street 
and Cayman Islands; they also include governments and legislation that 
allowed the spiral of financial innovation to get out of control. 
The role of public authors and regulators finance offers another sobering 
lesson in financial volatility today.  Precisely why and how was the sub-prime 
bubble allowed to inflate? Why were the worrying signs ignored? Were there 
any worrying signs? Below, this  paper suggests that there were, but  the chain 
of financial innovation, coupled with a sense of optimism  – often  propagated 
by politicians – made the underlying cause of fragility easy to overlook or 
misinterpret. That cause is to do with a complex issue of liquidity.  
 
The beast of liquidity  
Over the years, innovation in financial products and technologies has drawn 
praise from economists and market practitioners alike. The theory holds that 
new is good: competition for markets and profits encourages innovation in 
products, services, and most crucially, entails institutional change. Financial 
institutions have learned, through new tools and products, to spread risks 
across markets and companies, ensuring greater stability of the financial 
system and in the process, democratising access to credit. Yet Minsky offered a 
much more sombre reading of financial innovation. While adding to a sense of 
strength and liquidity of the individual financial units, the process of innovation 
shifts the system as a whole closer to the brink of a collapse and crisis. Charles 
Kindleberger, the great financial historian, noted that typically, it is the 
companies that are the last to adopt innovations which embody this systemic 
risk and bring it closer by their zealous drive for profits.10  
Financial innovation initially does add to a sense of greater liquidity in the 
markets. But according to Minsky, newly introduced credit products and 
channels, while adding to a sense of greater liquidity in ‘good times’, also 
contribute to progressive illiquidity of the system as a whole. When the ‘good 
times’ end, this progressive illiquidity turns into a systemic crisis of  unpayable 
                                                 
10 Kindleberger, C., 1988, The International Economic Order: Essays on Financial Crisis and 
nternational Public Goods, Brighton: Wheatsheaf.   
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debts – and it can happen in a flash. Which is what happened in August 2007, 
and continues to unravel at the time of writing. All this, it appears, is the 
outcome of a long-running problem of liquidity illusions that had underpinned 
the boom of structured finance and that has become a product of financial 
innovation.11 Three issues are worth mentioning here.  
First, the liquidity that has vanished from the markets overnight was not 
exactly the same liquidity that had been sitting in the vaults of the world’s 
central banks until early August 2007. This annoying and rather confusing fact 
was noted by several high-profile market analysts, but has not, as yet, been 
incorporated into any policy formula. The problem here is that ‘liquidity’ 
describes at the very least, three things: it is a quality of a product (or a market); 
it is a quantity of  money available in the system, and it is the ease by which 
transactions can be completed in a given market. And although ‘vanishing 
liquidity’ is partly caused by the disappearance of buyers and sellers at the 
market, liquidity is not only about the ease and velocity of transactions; it is also 
about the quality of assets. 
Second, as Keynes, Minsky, and many of their followers understood, 
liquidity of an individual portfolio or an institution is not synonymous with liquidity 
of the system as such. In fact, there is a trade-off between individual and 
systemic liquidity. Complacency and optimism about one’s positions in the 
market contribute to greater use of leverage and in Minsky’s framework, to a 
situation where hedged finance becomes speculative, and speculative finance 
becomes a Ponzi pyramid. The result is a progressively illiquid state of the 
market as a whole. Stretching this notion, we may argue that while every 
individual market is assumed to be liquid, the global financial system is 
progressively less so. Especially when a segment of a financial market is 
dominated by low-quality credit, and when this segment is tightly integrated with 
other financial segments.   
Third, problems of diagnosing liquidity strains in time, and discerning 
liquidity crisis from solvency crisis – a challenge currently facing those trying to 
muddle through the sub-prime mess - is only part of the bigger problem. And 
that problem is that financial innovation, while making various tiers of the global 
                                                 
11 For a more detailed discussion see Nesvetailova, A., 2008, “Liquidity Illusions and Global 
Financial Architecture”, IPEG Working papers No, 35.  www.bisa.ac.uk 
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credit system more interdependent,  has also fragmented the global financial 
market. Despite moves to greater transparency promoted by international 
financial regulators, and the so-called information glut, one cannot fail to be 
baffled by the growth of opaque markets for credit risk transfer, such as credit 
derivatives, structured financial instruments, OTC derivatives, and offshore 
finance. With such a multitude of financial instruments and markets, the 
meaning and functions of liquidity have been stretched, while public policy tools 
to mitigate these developments – interest rates, monetary targets, open market 
operations - have largely remained the same. 
It this regard, it is revealing that regulators and financiers understood 
immediately that the current crisis is a serious liquidity crunch. In August 2007, 
the central bankers of Europe, USA and Japan responded promptly to the 
liquidity crunch with massive credit infusions, but their initial measures were 
insufficient to stop the crisis from spreading. More serious fiscal stimuli offered 
by US president a few days ago, in turn, only distressed the markets further.   
The reaction of key central bankers show that they do not believe it was 
a crisis resulting from a lack of information, as more orthodox formulations of 
finance theory hold. Indeed, market watchdogs have long been warning about 
the stupendous levels of bad loans and mortgages extended to US consumers. 
Financial analysts, including researchers at international institutions, have also 
been arguing that securitisation has made the tasks of discerning the ‘ends’ of a 
financial transaction virtually impossible.  
Unlike many earlier financial crises, the current crunch is not the result of 
policy errors. While certainly some inept investment decisions have been made, 
most notably in the US mortgage market, and while the expansion of bad debts 
was made possible by the governmental policy of easy credit, it is not a crisis 
stemming chiefly from policy mistakes – at least not errors committed recently.  
Actually, to their credit, the principal financial regulators, including the BIS, the 
OECD and the Bank of England, have been warning for a while against 
overstretched credit and overleveraged portfolios of hedge funds. The crisis 
was predictable; what it showed is either the inability, or the unwillingness of 
regulators to intervene in the financial markets against their better judgement. 
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Concluding thoughts  
Regulators’ unwillingness to interfere in the markets is nothing new; it reflects 
the power of psychology driving the markets, and also pragmatism: as long as 
values are going up, nobody really is willing to ‘prick’ the bubble - the 
consequences may be severe. The inability of regulators to diagnose the 
systemic problem in time and act on it, on the other hand, is a much more 
serious issue.  Fundamentally, it shows  that  either the spiral of financial 
innovation got out of control, or/and  that the political benefits of deregulated 
credit markets are much higher than the social costs of financial crises -  which 
are inevitable, as Minsky and many others would remind us.  Both hypotheses 
raise critical political questions, most of which centre on the issue of public 
control over the essentially private realm of finance and credit. Central among 
these are questions  about accountability, social costs, regulation and 
governance, and – perhaps most urgently – exactly how much knowledge do 
financial and monetary regulators have about the ways financial markets work 
today?  
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